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Online Reputation Research – Motivation
Trust has been an important ingredient to human interaction ever
since.
Many types of interactions could simply not take place (i.e. would
be too costly) if none of the actors would take the risk of being
exploited.
Two important traditional mechanisms to induce trust and
trustworthy behavior in such situations are:
I repeated interaction (“the shadow of the future”)
I social embeddedness (enabling the exchange of information on an
actor’s past behavior⇒ reputation)
However: In interactions mediated through modern technologies
these two properties are often missing. Strangers meet
anonymously for one-shot exchanges.
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Online Reputation Research – Motivation
Assuming that at least some of the actors are rational and selfish
(and that these properties cannot be inferred with certainty), online
exchange among strangers would quickly collapse, or not come into
existence at all, unless there are some trust-warranting
mechanisms.
One apparent solution to the problem lies in the institutionalization
of a reputation system, as it is realized in many online markets such
as eBay:
I Feedback about the behavior of the partner can be provided after a
transaction.
I These “ratings” are made visible for all market participants.
I The set of ratings an actor received (or a function thereof) provides
the actor’s “reputation” and serves therefore as a substitute for social
embeddedness.
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Example:
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Research Questions and Evidence
However, it is not self-evident, for example
I what the optimal design for such online reputation systems would
be in different contexts,
I whether an online reputation system is sufficient to enable high
levels of trust and cooperation and, therefore, a smooth functioning
of online markets,
I what the actual market value of online reputation is,
I or what the conditions are to maintain a high level of participation in
the feedback mechanism.
Consequently, there is a large body of research concerned with such
questions.
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Research Questions and Evidence
For example, many studies evaluate the importance of online
reputation for transaction efficiency and market outcomes
(probability of sale, auction prices) using observational data from
online markets. Although most studies find effects, the results are
somewhat mixed and effect sizes are usually not very large.
However, reputation effects have also been confirmed in laboratory
and field experiments. We will not further treat this topic in today’s
session.
Theoretical studies and simulations are concerned with the
conditions under which reputation systems promote the evolution
of cooperation. More work needs to be done in this field.
Przepiorka’s talk today belongs in this domain.
A growing number of studies focus on the public-good problem of
providing feedback, which is the backbone of any online reputation
system. Three of today’s talks (Berger/Zimmermann; Abraham/
Hangartner/Wehrli; Jurca) are related to this topic.
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“Reputation effects” on eBay
Transaction process (GOR 2004)
End price
Time to first bid
Probability of sale
Choice of start price / reserve
Choice of payment mode
⇒ Direct effects on fitness
Feedback process (GOR 2006)
Effect of partner reputation on
submission rate (first mover)
⇒ Indirect effects on fitness
Open Questions:
Who has and who gets howmuch reputation in the network?
What are the consequences of network growth for the “trust metric” and relative
status positions of the users?
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What’s Cumulative Advantage (CA)?
“Cumulative advantage [...] refers to the social process through
which various kinds of opportunities for scientific inquiry [...] tends
to accumulate.” (Merton 1968, 1988)→Matthew effect!
“Cumulative advantage is a general mechanism for inequality
across any temporal process [...] in which a favorable relative
position becomes a resource that produces further relative gains.”
(Diprete 2006)
Simple Example:
Capital Stock with fixed interest rate.
CA also known as:
"Preferential Attachment", "multiplier effects", "first mover advantage", "scarring effects",
"the rich get richer", ...
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Examples for Cumulative Advantage in Networks
Newman (2003): The Structure and Function of Complex Networks.
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Data
Micro Level Data
Sample of 170’000 DVD auctions on
eBay.de, collected at 12-2004/01-2005
with a spidering approach.
Question: Why do users submit
feedback? What are
the effects on the
submission rate?
Model: Time to feedback after
a sucessful transaction
for seller and buyers.
Subset out of 1.1 Mio observed auctions
(Wehrli 2005).
Macro Level (Network) Data
Distribution of positive and negative
feedback at two time points (04-2005
and 10-2006) for two different samples
of the German eBay User Base.
Ego Network: Users from the Micro
Level Dataset (0.5 Mio)
Alter Network: Part of first snowball
wave of the “ego
network”, i.e. the
feedbacks of all users
connected with egos
(3.2 Mio)
DE Network: Work in progress...
(25 Mio)
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DVDMarket - Descriptives
Submissions of Ratings after Transactions (DVDMarket)
Seller Buyer
Number of transactions 177’561 (100%) 177’561 (100%)
Positive Ratings 146’693 (82.62%) 146’300 (82.39%)
Neutral Ratings 209 ( 0.12%) 702 ( 0.40%)
Negative Ratings 577 ( 0.32%) 643 ( 0.36%)
No Rating 30’082 (16.94%) 29’916 (16.85%)
In 89.6% of all transaction at least on submission.
In 53.2% of the cases buyer rates first (Seller: 36.1% / ) No or
simultanious feedback 10.7%).
Repeated interactions: ca. 5%.
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CA onMicro Level
Cox-Model for Submission of positive Feedbacks (DVDMarket)
Seller Buyer
Partner first (tvc) 2.021*** (0.118) 0.617*** (0.011)
Positive Partner Reputation 0.088*** (0.006) 0.098*** (0.004)
Negative Partner Reputation -0.184*** (0.016) -0.085*** (0.006)
Partner first X Pos. P.Rep. -0.099*** (0.010) -0.029*** (0.005)
Partner first X Neg. P.Rep. 0.163*** (0.023) -0.117*** (0.010)
Ego Positive Reputation 0.050** (0.016) 0.141*** (0.004)
Ego Negative Reputation -0.199*** (0.029) -0.253*** (0.010)
Repeated Interactions -0.281*** (0.077) -0.467*** (0.033)
Rolechange 0.175*** (0.051) 0.185*** (0.022)
User is identified 0.210* (0.084) 0.190*** (0.037)
Price -0.002 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000)
(. . . )
N (Clusters) 177’561 (29’816) 177’561 (99’139)
Events 146’693 146’300
Maximum likelihood estimates of the time to feedback (Cox Proportional Hazard Rate
Models) incorporating positive partner feedback as time-varying covariates. Absolute
z-statistics in parentheses (adjusted for clustering), significant at α = 0.05(∗), α =
0.01(∗∗), α = 0.001(∗∗∗).
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Macro Level: Degree distribution of positive feedback
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Degree distribution of negative feedback
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Estimation of Pareto Index
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
with Pareto Distribution:
CDF: Pr[X ≤ x] = 1− (a/x)α
PDF: Pr[X = x] = αaαx−(α+1)
Hill’s Estimator
αˆ = nn∑
i=1
log
(xi
a
)
Power law (PDF):
Pr[K = k] ∼ k−γ
⇒ γ = α+ 1
Bootstrap estimates of αˆ for the distribution
of positive and negative feedbacks⇒
Distribution of Positive Feedback
αˆ(a = 1) n
2005 0.257 457’255
2006 0.225 475,311
Alteri 0.266 3’280’884
Positives with arbitrary Cutoff
αˆ(a = 100) n
2005 1.017 157’925
2006 0.988 228’723
Alteri 1.201 873’525
Distribution of negative feedback
αˆ(a = 1) n
2005 2.012 124,011
2006 1.643 174’811
Alteri 1.874 933’398
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Or: Positive Reputation is lognormally distributed
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Sellers only! Pareto und Lognormal distributions are hard to distinguish!
Jann, Wehrli (ETH Zürich) Reputation Systems & CA GOR - March, 23 2007 17 / 18
Conclusions CA
There is empirical evidence for cumulative advantage on the micro
and macro level of the reputation network.
Pareto and Lognormal Distributions indicate that status hierarchies
are stable and that the “trust metric” follows a similar logic as
financal capital. There are just a few generative processes that can
explain the growth of the “eBay reputation network” (Yule- or
Gibrat-Process).
We need further analysis of growth processes in age cohorts to
disentangle user base growth from growth due to additional
transactions, reciprocity and strict cumulative advantage.
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